

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 NICOSI 01727 01 OF 02 090903Z

15

ACTION NEA-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ADP-00 EUR-10 IO-03 NSC-10 NSCE-00

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FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7692

AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

USMISSION USUN

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 NICOSIA 1727

LIMDIS

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CY, GR, TU

SUBJECT: NEW "PLAN" FOR RESOLUTION CYPRUS DISPUTE

SUMMARY: FOREIGN MINISTRY PRIVATELY ENDORSES AN "ELEVTEROS KOSMOS" (ATHENS) SUGGESTION FOR PLEBISCITE BETWEEN DOUBLE ENOSIS AND INDEPENDENCE FOR CYPRUS, AND APPEARS TO BE SEEKING OUR REACTION. WE THINK IDEA IS PROMISING IF GOVT OF GREECE CAN BE BROUGHT ABOARD, WHICH IS CRITICAL QUESTION. DEPT GUIDANCE REQUESTED AS TO RESPONSE TO FOREIGN MINISTRY. END SUMMARY

1. AUGUST 8 AFTERNOON PAPERS "MESIMVRINI" AND "APOGEVMATINI" FEATURE ATHENS STORY SAME DATE BY "ELEVTEROS KOSMOS" EDITOR SAVVAS KONSTANTOPOULOS SUGGESTING THAT, IN ORDER END CYPRUS PROBLEM AND MAKARIO-GRIVAS WRANGLE, PLEBISCITE ON ENOSIS CUM PARTITION OR INDEPENDENCE BE PUT TO CYPRUS PEOPLE.

2. ACCORDING KONSTANTOPOULOS, RESOLUTION OF CYPRUS

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 01727 01 OF 02 090903Z

QUESTION NOT POSSIBLE WITHOUT AGREEMENT BY TURKEY; NEITHER

IS ENOSIS POSSIBLE WITHOUT CEDING PART OF ISLAND TO TURKEY. PLAN AS PRESENTED WOULD HAVE GOG PRESIDENT PAPADOPOULOS INVITE MAKARIOS AND GRIVAS TO ATHENS TO EXAMINE CYPRUS PROBLEM AND FORMULATE ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS FOR RESOLVING IT. THROUGH PLEBISCITE CYPRUS PEOPLE WOULD THEN CHOOSE BETWEEN : (1) ENOSIS WITH PARTITION ("SOLUTION OF SACRIFICE"), IN WHICH CASE GREEK GOVT WOULD HANDLE NEGOTIATIONS ON TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS, OR (2) INDEPENDENCE ("SOLUTION OF NECESSITY" AS WAS IMPOSED BY CONDITIONS 1960), IN WHICH CASE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS WOULD PROCEED ON BASIS THAT NEITHER TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ISLAND NOR SOVEREIGNTY OF CYPRUS STATE WOULD BE DIVIDED OR WEAKENED. BOTH GRIVAS AND MAKARIOS WOULD BE BOUND FROM OUTSET TO RESPECT RESULT OF PLEBISCITE, WHICH COULD BE HELD "VERY QUICKLY." MEANWHILE, (1) PARA-STATE BANDS IN CYPRUS WOULD BE DISSOLVED, (2) THEIR ARMS SURRENDERED TO GREEK ARMY CONTINGENT, (3) ALL TERRORISTIC ACTIVITY WOULD CEASE, AND (4) GENERAL AMNESTY WOULD BE GIVEN.

3. AT LUNCH (BEFORE WE HAD SEEN ABOVE NEWS STORY), FONMIN DIRGEN VENIAMIN BROACHED SUBSTANTIALLY SAME PROPOSAL TO DCM. WHEN ASKED, HE SAID IT WAS JUST "PERSONAL IDEA." HE DID NOT MENTION THE ASPECT OF MEETING IN ATHENS, NOR DID HE INCLUDE PROVISION CONCERNING LAYING DOWN OF ARMS. HE ADDED THAT TURK CYPRIOTS SHOULD VOTE, TOO (HE ARGUED IT DESIRABLE TO HAVE THEIR PARTICIPATION, AND HE SAID THAT GREEK MAJORITY FOR INDEPENDENCE OPTION WOULD BE SO LARGE THAT TURKS COULD NOT UPSET IT EVEN IF THEY ALL VOTED FOR PARTITION.)

4. VENIAMIN ARGUED THAT GREEK CYPRIOT DRIVE FOR TERRITORIAL UNITY OF CYPRUS OUTWEIGHS ENOSIST ASPIRATIONS, AND THAT INDEPENDENCE OPTION WOULD WIN 90 PERCENT OF GREEK CYPRIOT VOTES EVEN IF PARTITION WERE CONCEALED IN PHRASE "DOUBLE ENOSIS."

5. ONCE CLEAR STATEMENT OF INDEPENDENCE GOAL THUS ACHIEVED, TURK AND GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD NEGOTIATE CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS DELIBERATELY AND IN GOOD FAITH.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 NICOSI 01727 01 OF 02 090903Z

6. DCM NOTED THAT, ON SUCH BASIS, PROPOSAL SHOULD BE ATTRACTIVE TO CYPRUS GOVT AS WAY OF LAYING GRIVASIST PROBLEM TO REST. WONDERED, HOWEVER, WHAT GREEK GOVT COULD BE EXPECTED TO SEE IN IT. VENIAMIN REACTION WAS THAT USG SHOULD PRESS ATHENS TO ACCEPT, IF THIS PROPOSAL FITTED OUR INTERESTS. PRESSED, HE DID NOT OFFER ANY SERIOUS REASONS FOR ASSUMING GOG INTEREST. (NOTE: CONVENIENT ESCAPE FROM THEIR GRIVAS DILEMMA WOULD SEEM ONE SUCH INTEREST;

ANOTHER WOULD BE PROSPECT OF REMOVING CONSTANT TURKISH SUSPICIONS AND DANGER OF CONFLAGRATION ACCIDENTALLY OR DELIBERATELY STARTED.) DCM VOLUNTEERED THAT ATHENS AND NICOSIA ARE BOTH BEDEVELLED BY FEAR OF BEING ACCUSED BY OTHER OF SELLING OUT ON ENOSIS. PROPOSAL OFFERED PROSPECT OF ENDING THIS PROBLEM BY GOING TOGETHER, AND THAT JOINT STATEMENT PROPOSING PLEBISCITE COULD INCLUDE STATEMENT THAT BOTH SIDES "RECOGNIZED THAT ENOSIS IS POLITICAL IMPOSSIBILITY." VENIAMIN PICKED UP SUGGESTION AS IF HE HAD BEEN WAITING FOR IT.

7. IN PROCESS ARGUING THAT USG SHOULD BE WILLING TO PRESS ATHENS TO ACCEPT SUCH A PROPOSAL, VENIAMIN SAID HE "HAD MADE CLEAR BEFORE THAT IF USG WOULD ONLY STATE THAT IT WOULD NOT TOLERATE BREAKUP OF INDEPENDENT CYPRUS, WE COULD BE ASSURED OF CYPRUS' COOPERATION IN PROVIDING BASES AND OTHER FACILITIES TO MEET ITS OBLIGATIONS IN EASTERN MED." HE OBSERVED THAT CYPRUS' SELF-INTEREST SUGGESTED THAT IT NOT BE LEFT IN EASTERN MED DOMINATED BY SOVIET NAVAL POWER ALL THE WAY TO ITALY. THIS STATEMENT CAME AS A RESPONSE TO DCM'S OBSERVATION THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE A DOLLAR FOR EVERY TIME ONE FRIEND HAD ASKED THE U.S. TO FORCE ANOTHER FRIEND TO DO SOMETHING, AND THAT USG INTERESTS IN GREECE INVOLVED MORE THAN SIMPLY THE CYPRUS PROBLEM, AND INCLUDED STRATEGIC ACCESS TO THE REGION. (NOTE: VENIAMIN HAS PRIVATELY MADE THE QUOTED SUGGESTION BEFORE, BUT NEVER SO EXPLICITLY.)
MCCLOSKEY

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PAGE 01 NICOSI 01727 02 OF 02 090941Z

11

ACTION NEA-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ADP-00 IO-03 EUR-10 NSC-10 NSCE-00

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FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

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AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 NICOSIA 1727

LIMDIS

8. WHEN DCM MENTIONED QUESTION OF POSSIBLE INTERMEDIARY TO NEGOTIATE WITH ATHENS, AND NEWS STORIES THAT INTER-MEDIARIES WERE HERE OR WERE COMING HERE FROM ATHENS, VENIAMIN PERKED UP BUT DID NOT RESPOND. WHEN DCM OBSERVED THAT USG WOULD PROBABLY NOT RPT NOT BE GOOD INTERMEDIARY IN THIS SITUATION, VENIAMIN RESPONDED DELPHICALLY THAT WE WERE "SOMETIMES POOR INTERMEDIARIES, BUT SOMETIMES GOOD ONES."

9. DISCUSSION CLOSED WITH DCM REMARK THAT SUGGESTION WAS AN INTERESTING AND POTENTIALLY USEFUL ONE. HE URGED THAT, IF THE PROPOSAL DEVELOPED BEYOND PURELY PRIVATE BRAINSTORM ON VENIAMIN'S PART, WE HOPED GOC WOULD KEEP IN TOUCH WITH US. VENIAMIN AGREED.

10. VENIAMIN SEEMED PLEASED AT PROSPECT THESE REMARKS WOULD BE RELAYED TO WASHINGTON, BUT WE SUGGEST HIS NAME BE KEPT OUT OF THIRD-PARTY DISCUSSIONS UNTIL WE HAVE CLEARER IDEA WHO IS DOING WHAT.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 01727 02 OF 02 090941Z

11. INITIAL (THURSDAY) LOCAL NEWSPAPER REACTIONS (E.G. "PHILELEFTHEROS" ENDORSEMENT) CONFIRM THAT MAKARIOS LIKES PROPOSAL. GRIVASIST "ETHNIKI" CLAIMS THAT REFERENDUM IDEA BELONGS TO GRIVAS, BUT INSISTS HIS FIVE POINTS (NICOSIA 1694) MUST BE MET BEFORE MEANINGFUL PLEBISCITE POSSIBLE.

12. COMMENT: VENIAMIN TOOK INITIATIVE IN THIS DISCUSSION, AND SEEMED VERY EAGER TO AIR PROS AND CONS. WE ASSUME CYPRUS GOVT EITHER INSPIRED "ELEVTHEROS KOSMOS" PROPOSAL OR IS MUCH ATTRACTED TO IT. VENIAMIN'S DECISION TO ESPOUSE PROPOSAL RATHER THAN SIMPLY PROBE OUR VIEW PRESUMABLY REFLECTS DESIRE TO GET AUTHORITATIVE IF PRIVATE INDICATION OF USG REACTION.

13. FROM CYPRUS GOVT STANDPOINT, PROPOSAL IS VERY ATTRACTIVE. IT OFFERS CHANCE TO FORCE GRIVAS EITHER TO ADMIT PRESENT IMPOSSIBILITY OF ENOSIS, OR AT LEAST TO DIVORCE ATHENS FROM GRIVAS. IF VENIAMIN'S ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT VOTE ARE CORRECT, PLEBISCITE WOULD REINFORCE ARCHBISHOP'S

MANDATE.

14. FROM USG STANDPOINT, OUR INITIAL REACTION IS TO THINK THIS PROPOSAL IS ALSO ATTRACTIVE, IF IT STANDS ANY CHANCE WITH GOVT OF GREECE. (WITHOUT ATHENS' ENDORSEMENT, IDEA IS DEAD, SINCE GRIVAS' OBVIOUS RESPONSE WOULD BE TO DEMAND CHOICE BETWEEN ENOSIS/GRIVAS AND INDEPENDENCE/MAKARIOS.) PROPOSED PLEBISCITE WOULD PROBABLY BE ATTRACTIVE TO TURKEY, WHATEVER THE RESULT, AND A CLEAR VOTE FOR INDEPENDENCE MIGHT DIMINISH RECURRENT TURKISH SUSPICIONS OF ATHENS' AND NICOSIA'S INTENTIONS AND--IF THE VERY PROCESS OF NEGOTIATING THIS PLEBISCITE DOES NOT EXACERBATE SUSPICIONS--CREATE CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS OF INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS.

15. WE WILL COMMENT FURTHER AS ISSUES HERE ARE CLARIFIED.

16. AS TO BAIT DANGLED PARA 7, WE THINK BEST TO IGNORE IT FOR THE PRESENT. WE HAVE FACILITIES WE REQUIRE HERE, AND ANY HINT THAT WE WERE TALKING OF SUCH A DEAL WOULD BRING SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES VERY STRONGLY INTO ARENA AGAINST WHOLE PROPOSITION, WHILE AS IT NOW STANDS THEY

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 NICOSI 01727 02 OF 02 090941Z

WOULD PROBABLY REGARD PROPOSED PLEBISCITE BENEVOLENTLY ONCE GOC CONVINCED THEM THAT VOTE WOULD GO FOR INDEPENDENCE. IN ANY EVENT, VENIAMIN'S PRIMARY PURPOSE WAS PROBABLY TO MAKE STRONG CASE AS TO WHY WE SHOULD NOT FEAR PUTTING PRESSURE ON GREECE, AND WE THINK THIS IS A PERSONAL IDEA RATHER THAN AN APPROVED GOC POSITION. END COMMENT

17. ACTION REQUESTED: WOULD APPRECIATE HEARING VIEWS ANKARA AND ATHENS, AND ON THAT BASIS RECEIVING DEPT THOUGHTS AS TO LINE WE SHOULD TAKE IN INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH FOREIGN MINISTRY AS TO USG VIEW OF PROPOSED PLEBISCITE PARA 1. MCCLOSKEY

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